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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Space Shuttle Atlantis was launched from Kennedy Space Center at 2:46:59.011
p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on May 4, 1989. The primary objective of the STS-
30 mission, deployment of the Magellan Spacecraft, was successfully accomplished.
Magellan is a scientific payload which will be used to gather high-resolution topographic
data and altimetry of the planet Venus.
After a successful flight of slightly over 4 days, Atlantis landed on concrete runway
22, in a 10-knot crosswind, at Edwards Air Force Base at 3:43:37.89 p.m. EDT on May
8, 1989. The STS-30 mission was relatively clean of major anomalies and problems.
Anomalies which relate to prior mission inflight anomalies or resolved significant risk
factors from prior flights include:
Failure of the left-hand forward field joint secondary heater during prelaunch
testing.
• Failure of the Reaction Control System Jet RIU during mated coast.
Failure of the Debris Containment System to properly contain fragments at
holddown posts #2, #3, #5, and #7.
Failure of the Auxiliary Power Unit No. 2 Gas Generator Heater System "A"
to respond in the A-Auto position.
These anomalies will be readdressed in the STS-28 Mission Safety Evaluation.

FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and the National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) Program Manager prior to each NSTS flight. The intent
of the MSE is to document significant safety risk factors that represent a change, or
potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) in the NSTS Hazard Reports. It also documents unresolved safety risk factors
impacting the STS-30 flight.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) and is updated for the Launch Minus 2 Day (L-2) Review.
For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in final postflight report format
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The Mission SafetyEvaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety,Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance(SRM&QA) and the
National SpaceTransportation System(NSTS) Program Manager with the NASA
Headquarters Safety Division position on significant changes,or potential changes,to the
Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changesto the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change,the primary purpose is to ensure that changeswhich
were too late to include in formal changesthrough the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
processare documentedalong with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addressesSTS-30safety risk factors that represent a significant change
from previous flights, factors from previous flights that have impact on this flight, and
factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that significantly (or have
the potential to) affect NSTS safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for
discussion or approval. These items are derived from a variety of sources such as issues,
concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower level
files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE has been updated subsequent to the mission to
add items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in seven sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a summary description of the STS-30 mission; a brief
flight/vehicle description, including launch data, crew size,
flight duration, launch and landing sites, and other related
information; and a brief payload description.
Section 3 Contains a summary listing of significant safety risk
factors/issues, considered resolved or not a safety concern prior
to STS-30 launch, that were impacted or repeated by anomalies
reported for the STS-30 flight.
Section 4 - Contains a summary listing of significant safety risk factors that
were considered resolved for STS-30.
Section 5 - Contains a summary listing of significant safety-of-flight
problems that developed during the STS-29 mission.
Section 6 - Contains a summary listing of significant safety-of-flight
problems that developed during the STS-27 mission.
Section 7 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 6. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A Contains the official STS-30 Inflight Anomaly (IFA) Report.
This report is included for completeness and reference
purposes. Those STS-30 IFAs which are considered to
represent significant safety risks will be addressed in the MSE
for the next NSTS flight.




2.1 Summary Description of STS-30 Mission
Space Shuttle Atlantis was launched from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at
2:46:59.011 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on May 4, 1989. The primary objective
of the STS-30 mission was deployment of the Magellan Spacecraft/Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) that was successfully accomplished. After a successful flight of slightly over 4
days, Atlantis landed at Edwards Air Force Base at 3:43:37.89 p.m. EDT on May 8,
1989.
Magellan is a scientific payload which will be used to gather high-resolution
topographic data and altimetry of the planet Venus. The spacecraft will use a 3.7-meter
high-gain antenna to gather Synthetic Aperture Radar data revealing terrain features as
small as 1 kilometer. The IUS is a two-stage solid propellant, inertiaUy stabilized upper
stage which will place Magellan in a transfer orbit from Earth to Venus. The IUS
ignites its first stage approximately 60 minutes after deployment. The two 1US stages
burn in quick succession intercepting a hyperbolic Earth escape vector and leading to an
arrival at Venus approximately 480 days later.
An initial attempt to launch Atlantis on April 28, 1989, was scrubbed. During the
attempt, the countdown was free of significant problems until the T-9 minute hold. A
five-minute unplanned extension of the T-9 minute hold occurred when a range safety
computer went off-line, creating a loss of redundancy in the range safety computer
network. After computer redundancy was reestablished, the countdown resumed. At
the T-31 second point, the launch countdown was automatically put on hold, and the
planned launch was subsequently scrubbed because of the failure of the liquid hydrogen
recirculation pump for Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) #1. Later inspection and
analysis revealed that phase B voltage to the pump was shorted to ground in a connector
within the pump. Because of the anomaly, the pump was replaced. The launch was
rescheduled for May 4 at 1:48 p.m. EDT.
On May 4, the launch countdown was initially held at T-9 minutes (launch minus
16 minutes) for 43 minutes because of unacceptable cloud cover and excessive
crosswinds at the Shuttle Landing Facility Return-to-Launch-Site (RTLS) runway.
Countdown was resumed at T-9 minutes at 2:15 p.m. EDT. The countdown continued
to T-5 minutes, when a hold was again initiated awaiting acceptable cloud cover and
crosswinds at the Shuttle Landing Facility. At approximately 2:41:59 p.m. EDT, weather
conditions were declared acceptable for launch, and the final countdown was resumed.
Atlantis was successfully launched at 2:46:59.011 p.m. EDT after an approximate 59-
minute delay.
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Immediately after External Tank (ET) separation at approximately nine minutes
into the flight, low chamber pressure caused the Reaction Control System (RCS)
thruster R1U to fail off when initially commanded to fire. Preliminary analysis indicated
that the fuel valve opened, but the oxidizer valve did not open upon command after ET
separation. It was acceptable to continue the mission since two same-direction-firing
pitch thrusters were still available in the right pod of the aft RCS.
About six hours into Flight Day 1, the crew successfully deployed the Magellan
IUS from the payload bay. The IUS was fired, at a safe separation distance from the
Orbiter, beginning Magellan's 15-month flight to Venus.
At the beginning of Flight Day 4, General Purpose Computer (GPC) #4 failed to
synchronize with the other GPCs. The dump data showed that GPC #4 had
experienced a "machine check interrupt," followed by GPCs #1 and #2 voting #4 out of
the common set. Data analysis revealed a data parity external storage error, which
indicated a possible hardware failure. The crew successfully performed an inflight
maintenance procedure to replace GPC #4 with the spare. After the initial program
load had been performed, the replacement computer was configured into the common
set and operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission.
A goal of STS-30 was to demonstrate a crosswind landing at Edwards AFB.
Development Test Objective 805, the crosswind landing test, has been targeted by the
program to expand the orbiter's flight envelope. As Atlantis descended through 179,000
feet flying at Mach 12, mission control instructed the Atlantis Commander, Capt. David
Walker, to change the orbiter navigation target to bring Atlantis down on Edwards
concrete runway 22, where conditions were best for a crosswind landing. The crosswind
landing was performed in winds of 10 knots, with gusts to 16 knots, from 270 degrees.
This gave the vehicle an 8-knot crosswind component from the right, close to the
parameter sought in the test objective.
The landing was smooth, with Atlantis rolling to a stop 10,295 feet down the
15,000-foot runway. Some tile damage was incurred aft of the main landing gear due to
tire shredding caused by lateral forces from the crosswind.
The crew reported lateral acceleration following nose gear touchdown. Data
recorded confirmed a 1/4-g lateral acceleration and about a 4-second delay from nose
gear touchdown to nose wheel steering enable. Investigation found that the rate at
which the nose landing gear was lowered during rollout caused the two weight-on-nose-
gear transducers to effect an excessive toggling within software limits. This caused the




• Launch Date: May 4, 1989
• Launch Time: 2:46:59.011 p.m. EDT
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 33
• TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
• Landing Date: May 8, 1989
• Landing Time: 3:43:37.89 EDT
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Runway 22
• Mission Duration: 4 Days, 56 Minutes
• Crew Size: 5
• Inclination: 28.85 Degrees
• Altitude: 160 Nautical Miles/Standard Insertion
• Orbiter: OV-104 (4)Atlantis
• SSMEs: 2027, 2030, 2029
• ET: ET-29
• SRBs: BI-027
• Total Cargo Weight: 45,817 Pounds
Orbiter Weight, Including Cargo: 260,878 Pounds (at SRB Ignition)
Total Vehicle Weight at SRB Ignition: 4,526,948 Pounds




• Magellan (MGN) Spacecraft/Inertial Upper Stage(IUS)
Middeck:
Air Force Maui Optical System (AMOS)
Fluids Expefimem Apparatus (FEA)
Mesoscale Lightning Experiment (MLE)
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Section 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-30 ANOMALIES
This section contains a summary listing of the significant safety risk factors/issues,
considered resolved or not a safety concern for STS-30 prior to launch (see Sections 4,
5, and 6), that were impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-30 flight.
The list indicates the section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) in which the item
is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description
of the item, and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
(Anomalies that arose during the STS-30 flight, that were not preflight safety risk
factors/issues, can be found in the complete STS-30 official irrflight anomaly report







Resolved Si_maificant Safety_ Risk Factors
Current spikes and subsequent
failure of the primary right-




The left-hand forward field joint
secondary heater failed the Dielectric
Withstanding Voltage (DWV) test
during prelaunch testing. As a
precaution, it was decided that the
secondary heater would only be used if
the primary heater failed. During the
countdown, the secondary heater was
inadvertently turned on for
approximately 4 minutes. This was due
to an operator error in correctly reading
the position of the cursor on the console
cathode ray tube. Note that the cursor
position for the right and the left
booster forward field joint heaters are
adjacent. While this is not necessarily a
risk for STS-28, it graphically
demonstrates that procedural
workarounds should be thoroughly
reviewed, down to the position of the
cursor on a screen if necessary, to




(RCS) Jet R1U failed off
during mated coast.
On STS-30, immediately after External
Tank (ET) separation, the identical RCS
Jet RIU thruster failed off when
commanded to fire. Indications are that
the oxidizer valve failed open. Because
this anomaly has been seen on two
different Orbiters, this risk factor will be
readdressed in the STS-28 MSE.
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ITEM
Section 5:STS-29 Inflight Anomalies
SRB 3 Debris Containment System
(DCS) plunger did not
properly seat at holddown
post #8.
Section 6:STS-27 Infligh_ Anomsli¢$
Orbiter 1 Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
No. 2 Gas Generator (GG)
Heater System "A" failed to
respond when switched to A-
Auto position. The crew
selected Heater System "B",
which appeared to fail on.
The crew cycled heater system
B off and on again, after
which the system functioned
properly for the remainder of
the flight.
COMMENT
The holddown post DCS did not
function properly at locations #2, #3,
#5, and #7 on STS-30. Failure of these
containment systems could allow
holddown post fragments to impact
Orbiter critical hardware. A design fix
was installed on all holddown posts for
the STS-28 evolution. This risk factor
will be readdressed in the STS-28 MSE.
On STS-30, APU No. 2 GG Heater
System "A" did not respond when the
switch was operated. The crew switched
to the "B" heater, which operated
correctly. Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
has been unsuccessful in recreating the
problem to date. The investigation
continues. Because this anomaly has
occurred on sequential flights of the
same vehicle (OV-104), this risk factor




RESOLVED STS-30SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary listing of the significant safety risk factors that
were considered resolved for STS-30. These items have been reviewed by the NASA
safety community. A description and information regarding problem resolution is
provided for each safety risk factor. The safety position with respect to resolution is
based on findings resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP), Program
Requirements Control Board (PRCB) reviews, or other special investigation findings. It
represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts




1 Engine Interface Unit single-point failure keeps the Engine Interface Unit







STS-29 and STS-30 tire inflation valves were overtorqued to 190-210 inch-
pounds instead of the correct 70-80 inch-pound specification range.
Failure of the valve prior to landing could result in loss of the Orbiter and
the crew.
OV-104 Tactical Air Command and Navigation System problems.
Engine #2 helium fill Check Valve on OV-104 failed in the open position.
A second failure in the fill quick disconnect at lift-off would result in the
loss of helium overboard.
Cold flow problem in Auxiliary Power Unit controller wiring harnesses.
OV-102 tile bonding problem.
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Authority and Loads may be violated
as the result of mismatched Aft Segment.
SRM
1 Current spikes and subsequent failure of the primary right-hand aft field





G15 nozzle seal bluing due to overheating.
Liquid Hydrogen Recirculation Pump failure.
Loose screw and excess retainer gap found in green-run tests of High
Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump unit 2126.
Cracks discovered in High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Bearing #1 and #3
cages at Stennis Space Center.
Cupwashers were found rotated on High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopumps






SECTION 4 INDEX - (Cont.)
Leak in 4-inch Liquid Hydrogen Recirculation Line.
Feedline elbow contamination suspected.
Disabling of the External Tank Tumble Valve.
GFE







Ground Umbilical Carrier Hate noise during mating.
Spurious signal locked the Orbiter Access Assembly extend locks after
Orbiter Access Assembly retraction.
Potential damage to payload bay doors due to misconfigured Thermal
Protection System waterproofing guns.





Inertial Upper Stage-1 Aft Frame Tilt Actuator has a single-point failure
that can cause a runaway condition.
Battery harness and thermal blanket damaged by fire during spacecraft
integration at Kennedy Space Center.
If an anomaly occurs after batteries are activated requiring a mission
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This section contains a supplementary list of significant inflight anomalies arising
from the STS-29 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance




1 Excessive vapor at Liquid Hydrogen External Tank/Orbiter umbilical area
















Gaseous Oxygen Flow Control Valves can lock up due to contamination.
Main Propulsion System Liquid Hydrogen feed manifold leak.
Hydraulic leak in aft compartment.
Thermal blankets in payload bay found to be loose and damaged.
The 17-inch Liquid Hydrogen disconnect leak.
Reaction Control System jet R1U failed off during mated coast.
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution cryogenic Hydrogen tank 3
pressure was high and manifold pressures erratic.
Payload bay door B close indication failure.
Water Spray Boiler #3 low relief valve reseat pressure.
Water Spray Boiler #1 exceeded specification leak rate.
Liquid Hydrogen 4-inch disconnect slow to dose.
Flash Evaporator System primary controller B outlet oscillation.
Fuel Cell #1 water relief valve temperature overshoot.





Extensive damage to Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Vector Control
components.
Structural crack found in the left aft skirt intermediate ring cap.







SECTION 5 INDEX (Cont.)
Left aft center factory joint had several adhesive unbonds of the EPDM
vulcanized weather seal.
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This section contains a summary listing of the STS-27 inflight anomalies. Each
anomaly is briefly described, and the resolution is addressed. STS-27/OV-104 anomalies




Launch Systems Evaluation Advisory Team program error could have











Auxiliary Power Unit No. 2 Gas Generator Heater System "A" failed to
respond when switched to A-Auto position. The crew selected Heater
System "B," which appeared to fail on. The crew cycled Heater System
"B" off and on again, after which the system functioned properly for the
remainder of the mission.
Right Reaction Control System oxidizer "B" Helium Regulator response
slow.
Humidity Separator B flooded. The crew reported that about two gallons
of free water was discovered in and around the Environmental Control and
Life Support Subsystem bay.
During ascent and descent, Hydraulic System No. 2 accumulator pressure
read low.
A carrier panel on the right Orbital Maneuvering System pod was
discovered missing during postlanding tile inspection.
Cabin Temperature Controller 2 was nonresponsive. The crew reported
that it was frozen and would not move when the cabin temperature
selector position was changed.
Liquid Hydrogen topping valve (PV13) showed simultaneous open/closed
indications during dump and vacuum inert.
Tactical Air Command and Navigation System No. 1 (prelaunch) did not
lock onto Kennedy Space Center ground station; Tactical Air Command
and Navigation System cycled and then locked on with normal data.
Certain Eaton/Dill pneumatic valve caps may cause loss of pressure.
During STS-27, the OV-104 Liquid Hydrogen outboard 8-inch Main
Propulsion System Fill and Drain Valve closed slower than OMRSD
requirements.
During closure of External Tank doors, no Ready-to-Latch No. 2 indicator
was received. No. 1 & 3 received properly. No. 2 RTL limit switch





SECTION 6 INDEX (Cont.)
Shoe shims missing. STS-27 postflight inspection results showed that the
Epon shoe shims were partially missing.





Cork missing from fight-hand center field joint on STS-27.





Liquid Oxygen pump bearing anomaly. Cracked inner race found on #3
bearing of High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump 9109R1.
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This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 6. It is intended as a supplement to
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Aft Frame Tilt Actuator
Anti-Hood Valve
Air Force Maui Optical System
Auxiliary Power Unit
Acceptance Test Procedure






































































LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Fahrenheit





Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety























High Pressure Fuel Turbopump


























































Launch Systems Evaluation Advisory Team





Maximum Expected Operating Pressure
Magellan
Megahertz














































LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont.)





NASA Safety Reporting System





Operations and Maintenance Instruction













Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
Program Requirements Control Board
Program Requirements Control Board Document
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Differential






















































Return to Launch Site
Room Temperature Vulcanizate
Serial Number
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
Standard Cubic Inches Per Minute
Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute








Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Space Transportation System
Troubleshoot
Tactical Air Command and Navigation System
Text and Graphic System
Trident Acquisition Impact Location
Transatlantic Abort Landing










LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Volts Direct Current
Relative Velocity
Weight On Wheels
Water Spray Boiler
B-6
